Most philosophers of criminal law agree that between criminal offences and defences there is a significant, substantial difference. It is a difference, however, that has proved hard to pin down. In recent work, Duff and others have suggested that it mirrors the distinction between criminal answerability and liability to criminal punishment. Offence definitions, says Duff, are—and ought to be—those action-types ‘for which a defendant can properly be called to answer in a criminal court, on pain of conviction and condemnation if (...) she cannot offer an exculpatory answer’; and defences are ‘exculpatory answers’ that ‘block the transition from responsibility to liability’. I criticise this answerability-based account of the offence/defence divide. It is descriptively false, I claim, as well as normatively unappealing. (shrink)

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld's account of legal rights is now 100 years old. It has been much discussed, and remains very influential with philosophers and lawyers alike. Yet it is still sometimes misunderstood in crucial respects. This article offers a rigorous exposition of Hohfeld's framework; discusses its claims to comprehensiveness and fundamentality, reviewing recent work on the topic; and highlights the argumentative uses of Hohfeld's most important distinction.

Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend (...) two theses. I argue, first, that the notion of a detached statement cannot be made to work, and that Raz’s problem is thus not thereby solved. But the problem itself, I also suggest, is a false one. (shrink)

You find yourself in a court of law, accused of having hit someone. What can you do to avoid conviction? You could simply deny the accusation: 'No, I didn't do it'. But suppose you did do it. You may then give a different answer. 'Yes, I hit him', you grant, 'but it was self-defence'; or 'Yes, but I was acting under duress'. To answer in this way-to offer a 'Yes, but...' reply-is to hold that your particular wrong was committed in (...) exceptional circumstances. Perhaps it is true that, as a rule, wrongdoers ought to be convicted. But in your case the court should set the rule aside. You should be acquitted. Within limits, the law allows for exceptions. Or so we tend to think. In fact, the line between rules and exceptions is harder to draw than it seems. How are we to determine what counts as an exception and what as part of the relevant rule? The distinction has important practical implications. But legal theorists have found the notion of an exception surprisingly difficult to explain. This is the longstanding jurisprudential problem that this book seeks to solve. The book is divided into three parts. Part I, Defeasibility in Question, introduces the topic and articulates the core puzzle of defeasibility in law. Part II, Defeasibility in Theory, develops a comprehensive proof-based account of legal exceptions. Part III, Defeasibility in Action, looks more closely into the workings of exceptions in accusatory contexts, including the criminal trial. (shrink)

Forty years after his death, Hans Kelsen (1881-1973) remains one of the most discussed and influential legal philosophers of our time. This collection of new essays takes Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law as a stimulus, aiming to move forward the debate on several central issues in contemporary jurisprudence. The essays in Part I address legal validity, the normativity of law, and Kelsen's famous but puzzling idea of a legal system's 'basic norm'. Part II engages with the difficult issues raised by (...) the social realities of law and the actual practices of legal officials. Part III focuses on conceptual features of legal systems and the logical structure of legal norms. All the essays were written for this volume by internationally renowned scholars from seven countries. Also included, in English translation, is an important polemical essay by Kelsen himself. (shrink)

More than 50 years after it was first published, The Concept of Law remains the most important work of legal philosophy in the English-speaking world. In this volume, written for both students and specialists, 13 leading scholars look afresh at Hart's great book. Unique in format, the volume proceeds sequentially through all the main ideas in The Concept of Law: each contributor addresses a single chapter of Hart's book, critically discussing its arguments in light of subsequent developments in the field. (...) Four concluding essays assess the continued relevance for jurisprudence of the 'persistent questions' identified by Hart at the beginning of The Concept of Law. The collection also includes Hart's 'Answers to Eight Questions', written in 1988 and never before published in English. Contributors include Timothy Endicott, Richard HS Tur, Pavlos Eleftheriadis, John Gardner, Grant Lamond, Nicos Stavropoulos, Leslie Green, John Tasioulas, Jeremy Waldron, John Finnis, Frederick Schauer, Pierluigi Chiassoni and Nicola Lacey. (shrink)

Successful accounts of analogy in law have two burdens to discharge. First, they must reflect the fact that the conclusion of an argument by analogy is a normative claim about how to decide a certain case. Second, they must not fail to accord relevance to the fact that the source case was authoritatively decided in a certain way. We argue in the first half of this paper that the common view of the structure of analogical arguments in law cannot overcome (...) these hurdles. In the second half we develop an original account that aims to succeed where others failed. (shrink)

This paper discusses the first incarnation of what came to be known as the “Frege-Geach” point. The point was made by Peter Geach in his 1960 essay “Ascriptivism”, and developed in “Assertion”, a 1965 piece. Geach’s articles launch a wholesale attack on theories of non-descriptive performances advanced by “some Oxford philosophers” whom he accuses of ignoring “the distinction between calling a thing ‘P’ and predicating ‘P’ of a thing”. One view that Geach specifically targets is H. L. A. Hart’s claim (...) that sentences of the form “X φ-ed” are not primarily descriptive but ascriptive of responsibility for actions. Hart explicitly accepted Geach’s criticism, and disowned his essay. I argue that he was wrong to do so. Perhaps the essay was worth retracting, but not because of Geach’s objections. I begin by restating and refining Geach’s arguments, in order to bring out the flaw he claimed to have detected in the “pattern of philosophising” that he took Hart’s essay to exemplify. I go on to argue that Geach’s original point poses no obstacle either to non-descriptivism in general, or to Hart’s sui generis non-descriptivist claim in particular. (shrink)

Our paper has three parts. In Part 1, we discuss John Gardner’s thesis that the non-elliptical ascription of agency to law is a necessary and irreducible part of any adequate explanation of the activities of legal officials. We consider three explananda which might conceivably necessitate this ascription, and conclude that none in fact does so. In Part 2, we discuss two other theses of Gardner’s: that it makes no sense to ascribe to law the claim that there are legal obligations (...) , and that law’s claim is the claim that there are moral obligations . We take issue with Gardner’s arguments for , and suggest that is unwarranted in the absence of an argument that law makes any claims at all. In Part 3, we briefly argue that, insofar as it issues requirements, there are certain claims that law cannot but make. We conclude that if Gardner is right that law’s claims are those of certain of its officials, it is law-making and not law-applying officials who make law’s claim. (shrink)

Can there be a non-reductivist, source-based explanation of the use of normative language in statements describing the law and legal situations? This problem was formulated by Joseph Raz, who also claimed to have solved it. According to his well-known doctrine of ‘detached’ statements, normative legal statements can be informatively made by speakers who merely adopt, without necessarily sharing, the point of view of someone who accepts that legal norms are justified and ought to be followed. In this paper I defend (...) two theses. I argue, first, that the notion of a detached statement cannot be made to work, and that Raz’s problem is thus not thereby solved. But the problem itself, I also suggest, is a false one. (shrink)

: In this paper we examine two challenges to the orthodox understanding of the fallacy of denying the antecedent. One challenge is to say that passages thought to express the fallacy can usually be given an interpretation on which they express valid arguments, entitling us to query whether the fallacy is commonly, if ever, committed at all. We discuss this claim in Section 1. The second challenge comes from those who think that there are legitimate uses of denying the antecedent (...) that have traditionally been overlooked. In Section 2 we propose a general test for claims of this sort, and assess three versions of this view. (shrink)

This short paper addresses a well‐known difficulty in the Pure Theory of Law: the definition of a legal wrong. Kelsen was unable to offer a suitable one, critics say. I agree. But the critics misdiagnosed the problem, and prescribed for it a fruitless solution. The reason for Kelsen’s failure, the critics say, was that he thought the law consists only of sanction‐stipulating norms addressed to officials, and does not comprise duty‐imposing norms addressed to citizens. But the critics are wrong, exegetically (...) as well as substantively. Kelsen did not—and indeed could not—deny that there are such duty‐imposing norms; and it is not the case, in any event, that the admission that there are such norms would enable us to explain the notion of a legal wrong. Kelsen failed to provide an adequate characterization of the notion of a legal wrong, yes, but for a different reason. (shrink)

The distinction between 'conduct norms' and 'sanction norms' is widely assumed to be an essential tool for any correct understanding of criminal responsibility. Conduct norms (often also called 'primary') are referred to with the language of 'prohibitions', and it is normally accepted that a crime is by definition a 'prohibited' human behaviour, in the sense that it is always an infraction of a 'conduct norm'. I mean to discuss and criticize this rather consensual assumption. Modern criminal codes don't usually incorporate (...) a catalogue of prohibitions, but this is considered to be of no consequence when it comes to discuss whether the law prohibits those behaviours whose performance may lead to the application of a criminal sanction: there is no question that sanction norms may be properly read out of the special parts of our criminal codes, and from a sanction norm it is always possible to infer the correspondent prohibition. Or so the current understanding goes. I shall first try to make some sense of this common idea, which I call the inference thesis. I will then proceed to show why it is wrong. The inference thesis is necessarily committed to an understanding of conduct norms as prescriptive norms addressed to citizens, and the relevant notion of a prescriptive norm has to be characterized in some detail. Having done so, I will argue that such a prescriptive understanding of 'conduct norms' is incompatible with several aspects common to most modern systems of criminal law and unquestionably essential to the concept of a crime. (shrink)

In his essay “Pre-Conventions: A Fragment of the Background”, Bruno Celano seems to endorse three claims about what he calls ‘pre-conventions’: that such ‘entities’ exist; that they are neither rules nor de facto regularities; and that their ‘character’ is at once factual and normative: that pre-conventions are “literally, ‘normative facts’.” I suggest that and are not particularly striking claims, and that Celano’s case for is unpersuasive.

I propose and defend a proof-based account of legal exceptions. The basic thought is that the characteristic behaviour of exceptions is to be explained in terms of the distinction, relative to some given decision-type C in some decision-making context, between two classes of relevant facts: those that may, and those that may not, remain uncertain if a token decision C is to count as correctly made. The former is the class of exceptions. A fact F is an exception relative to (...) some decision-type C, I claim, if (i) the ascertainment of F is sufficient for a token decision C not to count as correctly made, and (ii) the ascertainment of the negation of F is not necessary for a token decision C to count as correctly made. I also recuperate, reconstruct and discuss some of HLA Hart’s early views on defeasible judicial decisions. These two projects are closely connected: the latter is a vehicle for the former. (shrink)

Ce travail concerne la régulation morale de la Personne dans Je contexte du Brésil des années vingt aux années quarante, à partir de l'analyse des intenses rapports tissés dans cette période entre lanthropologie et la psychanalyse. Il décrit les conditions dans lesquelles s'établit Je dialogue entre ces deux savoirs, dans Je cadre des projets de «civilisation» du pays, entre les initiatives d'éducation et d'hygiénisation de l'État central et les débats médicaux et intellectuels sur les rapports entre l'héritage «africain» et la (...) possibilité de dépasser la condition culturelle « arriérée » du pays. (shrink)

Este pequeno texto é uma singela homenagem que dedico para o meu exprofessor da graduação em Filosofia e meu orientador no mestrado em Ética e Epistemologia da UFPI. Trata-se de um texto rememorativo e de agradecimentos pela convivência e aprendizagem que tive com o professor Dr. José Sérgio D. da Fonseca. A grata oportunidade de conhecer o professor Dr. José Sérgio ocorreu-me por volta do ano 2009 em uma disciplina de seminário, na qual o professor José Sérgio ministrou um curso (...) sobre filosofia da mente, se minha memória não falha. (shrink)

This study aims to map out the relationships that make up green innovation initiatives in Brazilian industry. The sample comprised 100 managers at manufacturing companies, most of them operating in the business of farm machinery and equipment and steel structures. To develop this study, Medeiros et al. study, mapping critical factors that drive the success of green product innovation and the paradigm of complexity, was used as a reference study. Based on the results, it was possible to identify that the (...) operational dynamic of the factors and variables that affect market success do not happen in an isolated or fragmented way; they occur systematically with different contingencies and structured basic and intermediate skills in order to meet the expectations of consumers, laws, and environmental legislation. Initially, the technological expertise factor was noted as very important for sustaining green product innovation. Furthermore, since proactive leaders are an important factor for successfully developing environmentally sustainable products, it must be added to technological expertise as the foundation for developing green innovation. After defining the basis for green product innovation, the intermediary conditions necessary for using the available technology appropriately were mapped out. In this sense, variables such as “elimination of cultural barriers,” “capacity for critical reflective analysis,” and “experimentation” are also very important. In addition, some of the variables of the cross-functional collaboration and market knowledge factors were a part of the structure that organizations need to transform potential into developing green products, which is the basis for the third level of the model. The fourth level of the model has the “meeting consumer expectations” and “following law and legislation” factors, which make up the main goals for developing environmentally sustainable products according to a number of surveys that were conducted. (shrink)

Nos livros impressos, nem sempre as imagens estão de acordo com os textos que deveriam ilus­trar. Neste artigo, o autor analisa algumas estampas xilográficas que estão em desacordo com os textos que 'ilustram', em O Flos Sanctorum em linguagem português, impresso em Lisboa, por Hermão de Campos & Roberto Rabelo, em 1513.

Le discours managérial constitue un véritable genre et représente une catégorie particulière au sein des énoncés performatifs. L’objectif annoncé de présentation des orientations stratégiques et de dynamisation des équipes s’accompagne d’une mise en scène particulière qui constitue une des conditions de sa félicité, de son accomplissement. Le contexte d’internationalisation et d’interdépendance dans lequel se déroule l’activité des entreprises renforce la stéréotypie de ce langage qui mobilise un format, un vocabulaire et une syntaxe particulière marqués par l’anglicisme et l’asyncticité. Destiné à (...) unifier et à galvaniser les équipes, ce langage est porteur de signes de pouvoir et de distinction, il exclut plus qu’il n’inclut, génère la perplexité et le désarroi et s’inscrit dans une stratégie du flou qui semble être le seul mode contemporain de l’avenir économique. Circulant à l’envi dans la communauté internationale et de la finance qu’il unifie à sa manière, il a une force incantatoire sur la scène financière et médiatique mais un impact paradoxal sur le travail quotidien des hommes et des femmes. Langage de la spéculation et de l’anticipation, il est plus proche des discours de la performance que des énoncés performatifs.Managerial language is a genre in itself and makes up a particular category of performative speech. The stated objective when presenting strategic goals or team building strategies is always dressed up in a particular way that will determine its aptness and success. The context of internationalisation and interdependence in which business activities take place reinforces a stereotype of management-speak, based on a particular format, vocabulary and grammar permeated by anglicisms and lack of syntax. Aimed at unifying and galvanising business teams, « corpu-speak » conveys a sense of power and distinctiveness, suggests exclusiveness rather than inclusiveness, generates bewilderment and anxiety and is very much at one with the strategy of obfuscation that seems to be the sole contemporary register where the economic future is concerned. Circulating freely within the international and finance community and uniting it as it goes, it acts with the hypnotic effect of incantation on the financial and media scene but has a paradoxical impact on the daily working lives of men and women. As the language of speculation and anticipation, it is more akin to performance discourse than to performative speech. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende discutir a universalidadedo problema hermenêutico na perspectivade H. G. Gadamer. O ponto de partida é areviravolta ontológica da hermenêutica realizadapor Heidegger. Por isso, tomando a ontologiafundamental como referência inicial, Gadamerapresenta a historicidade como princípio hermenêuticobásico e descobre na linguagem olugar filosófico por excelência, pois ela é, aomesmo tempo, acontecimento, especulação eabertura. Gadamer considera que no centroespeculativo da linguagem acontece a maisradical experiência humana: a experiência dafinitude.

Este artigo é um diálogo com Hegel e Gadamer, partindo da pergunta: "O que é arte?''. Hegel é um divisor de águas; pode-se dizer que a arte antes de Hegel é uma coisa e depois de Hegel outra. Com Hegel diremos que a arte "morreu" ou foi supra assumida pelo espírito absoluto; se isso não significa morte, é, pelo menos, perda de identidade - de autonomia. Com Gadamer diremos que a arte é arte, sem estar dizendo uma tautologia; pois essa (...) seria a melhor forma de dizer que arte não tem conceito e nem depende de conceito para ser arte; a arte é enquanto tal, sem pendências e sem dependências. (shrink)

Anamnese - a filosofia e o retomo do reprimido, do professor Ernildo Stein, éum conjunto de doze ensaios, publicados em 1997 pela Editora da PUCRS, que nosbrinda com temas da relação Filosofia-Psicanálise, numa linguagem polêmica,associada a um estilo literário e livre. Sendo um livro de ensaios, não há exigênciade uma leitura seqüenciada, nem de conhecimento profundo de filosofia e psicanálise,mas, com certeza, o leitor será naturalmente lançado num campo muitofértil, cujas trilhas de discussão e as notáveis elaborações construídas são umconvite (...) ao estudo dos temas e problemas tratados. (shrink)

A partir de los planteamientos de Michel Foucault se abordan las maneras de gobernar del Estado neoliberal con el objetivo de identificar y comprender las diferencias que existen entre la gubernamentalidad liberal y neoliberal. También se busca determinar si los Estados neoliberales sustentan su gubernamentalidad en la producción de precariedad, planteamiento propuesto por Isabell Lorey. Se concluye, de este ejercicio, que el neoliberalismo establece unas formas de gobernar distintas a las del liberalismo clásico, formas que se encuentran en constante expansión (...) como procesos económico-jurídicos inacabados que reposan, fundamentalmente, sobre el Estado. Se logra determinar, también, que no es un objetivo del Estado neoliberal producir precariedad. Sin embargo, la precariedad es producto de una manera de gobernar que considera que tanto el Estado como los sujetos y las poblaciones se encuentran sometidos a las reglas del mercado. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é refletir sobre o modo como as lutas locais e suas movimentações em torno do discurso dos direitos humanos podem ser alçadas à condição de ação política. Trata-se da tentativa de ampliar o conceito de política tendo em vista a potência de transformação contida nos coletivos de subjetividades portadoras de experiências comuns de violência e sofrimento. Fazendo uso do conceito de quilombo, em Beatriz Nascimento, buscaremos fundamentar o alargamento da ideia de política a partir de duas (...) configurações: a disputa por territórios e a conectividade entre saberes específicos e menores oriundos das lutas. Para tanto, cotejaremos o pensamento da autora com a filosofia contemporânea de Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze e Félix Guattari. Nossa hipótese é a de que o conceito de ação política demandaria um alargamento em sua formulação de modo a abranger as variadas e singulares formas de resistência cotidianas. (shrink)

Este artigo é uma tentativa de mostrar, a partir de Gadamer, que o Mito está em estreita relação dialética com o Logos e que a compreensão de ambos pertence a um mesmo movimento circular e hermenêutico, que conecta os conceitos de indeterminado e determinada, incerto e certo, infinitude e finitude.

Sentences such as "The author started the book" are indeterminate because they do not make explicit what the subject (the author) started doing with the object (the book). In principle, indeterminate sentences allow for an infinite number of interpretations. One theory, however, assumes that these sentences are resolved by semantic coercion, a linguistic process that forces the noun "book" to be interpreted as an activity (e.g., writing the book) or by a process that interpolates this activity information in the resulting (...) enriched semantic composition. An alternative theory, pragmatic, assumes classical semantic composition, whereby meaning arises from the denotation of words and how they are combined syntactically, with enrichment obtained via pragmatic inferences beyond linguistic-semantic processes. Cognitive neuroscience studies investigating the neuroanatomical and functional correlates of indeterminate sentences have shown activations either at the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex or at the left inferior frontal gyrus. These studies have supported the semantic coercion theory assuming that one of these regions is where enriched semantic composition takes place. Employing fMRI, we found that indeterminate sentences activate bilaterally the superior temporal gyrus, the right inferior frontal gyrus, and the anterior cingulate cortex, more so than control sentences ("The author wrote the book"). Activation of indeterminate sentences exceeded that of anomalous sentences ("…drank the book") and engaged more left- and right-hemisphere areas than other sentence types. We suggest that the widespread activations for indeterminate sentences represent the deployment of pragmatic-inferential processes, which seek to enrich sentence content without necessarily resorting to semantic coercion. (shrink)